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Introduction: A recent health reform was implemented in Chile (the AUGE reform) with the objective of reducing
the socioeconomic gaps to access healthcare. This reform did not seek to eliminate the private insurance system,
which coexists with the public one, but to ensure minimum conditions of access to the entire population, at a
reasonable cost and with a quality guarantee, to cover an important group of health conditions. This paper’s main
objective is to enquire what has happened with the use of several healthcare services after the reform was fully
implemented.
Methods: Concentration and Horizontal Inequity indices were estimated for the use of general practitioners,
specialists, emergency room visits, laboratory and x-ray exams and hospitalization days. The change in such indices
(pre and post-reform) was decomposed, following Zhong (2010). A “mean effect” (how these indices would change
if the differential use in healthcare services were evenly distributed) and a “distribution effect” (how these indices
would change with no change in average use) were obtained.
Results: Changes in concentration indices were mainly due to mean effects for all cases, except for specialists
(where “distribution effect” prevailed) and hospitalization days (where none of these effects prevailed over others).
This implies that by providing more services across socioeconomic groups, less inequality in the use of services was
achieved. On the other hand, changes in horizontal inequity indices were due to distribution effects in the case of
GP, ER visits and hospitalization days; and due to mean effect in the case of x-rays. In the first three cases indices
reduced their pro-poorness implying that after the reform relatively higher socioeconomic groups used these
services more (in relation to their needs). In the case of x-rays, increased use was responsible for improving its
horizontal inequity index.
Conclusions: The increase in the average use of healthcare services after the AUGE reform has not always led to
improved equity in the use of such services in most services. This indicates that there are still barriers to the
equitable use of healthcare services (e.g. insufficient medical human resources, financial barriers, capacity
constraints, etc.) that have remained after the reform.
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Among the Latin American countries Chile stands out
for both its accelerated growth through the ‘90s and the
improvements in its social indicators over the past dec-
ades. The per capita income in Chile during the 80s was
similar to that of China and Jordan today, whereas the
current average income is equivalent to that of Poland
or Croatia (based on GDP per capita in dollars, year* Correspondence: guillermo.paraje@uai.cl
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distribution, and reproduction in any medium2000) [1]. In terms of the Human Development Index,
Chile received 45th place in 2010, the highest in Latin
America. The analysis of the evolution of this indicator
shows that Chile incremented its position greatly due to
the increase in life expectancy. This indicator went from
69.2 years in 1980 to 76.8 years in 2000, and 78.8 years
today, equivalent to that of developed countries, such
as Denmark, Portugal, USA, etc. However, after this
spell of growth with improvements in social indicators,
Chile still remains one of the most unequal countriesentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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coefficient) [1].
Health indicators also experienced favorable results
and improvements. The infant mortality rate went from
23 in 1985 (similar to Nicaragua or Philippines today) to
7 in 2009 (similar to USA or Slovakia) [1]. Maternal
mortality ratios also decreased from 56 in 1990 (equiva-
lent to current levels in Brazil or Vietnam) to 26 in 2008
(similar to present day Turkey or USA) [2]. An acceler-
ated demographic transformation was observed after
improvements in health indicators, which ultimately
changed the epidemiologic profile of the population.
Figure 1 shows that the evolution of causes of death
has varied between 1960 and 2009: cases linked to
the elderly population, such as vascular problems or
tumors have gained importance over those associated to
respiratory, postnatal, or infectious diseases.
Over this period the Chilean health system underwent
numerous reforms, yet only two of these merit special
analysis. The first, implemented in 1979, created a pri-
vate insurance system (Instituciones de Salud Previ-
sional, also known as ISAPRES), which would coexist
with a public insurance system, the only one present be-
fore the reform. The private system has a completely dif-
ferent logic compared to that of the public insurance
system (of Bismarckian influence) because it started link-
ing the individual insurance coverage with the payment
capacity of each person. The private system began to se-
lect individuals based on their solvency and risk. On the
other hand, the public insurance system (National
Health Fund or FONASA) cannot take into account the
financial solvency or payment capacity of its clients be-
fore determining the coverage given; it can only recollectFigure 1 Chile: Evolution of causes of death (1960–2009) [3].a fixed percentage of the individuals’ income. This even-
tually resulted in a duality of insurance systems, in
which the private sector gained relatively wealthier
and healthier individuals while the public system
kept the rest.
The second reform was implemented in 2005 and was
aimed at correcting some of the defects presented in the
Chilean health system, especially those that caused such
unequal results. The objective of the AUGE reform
(Spanish acronym for Universal Access with Explicit
Guarantees) was to reduce existing socioeconomic gaps
in the health system without greatly affecting the duality
that has prevailed since the reform of '79. The AUGE re-
form did not seek to eliminate the private insurance sys-
tem, but to ensure minimum conditions of access to the
entire population for certain health conditions, at a rea-
sonable cost and with a quality guarantee. In the context
of a dual insurance system, universality of access would
involve increasing fairness. After almost seven years
since this reform was implemented there are virtually no
studies that measure the impact of the AUGE reform on
equity in the health system. There is no available data, at
least to the public eye, on the subject and the few
studies that have been published on this reform refer to
the impact it has had on the aggregate use of medical
services ([4,5]).
The aim of this paper is to provide an estimate on
how equity in the use of healthcare services has changed
before and after the AUGE Reform. This was done using
household surveys conducted pre- and post-reform,
which measure the use of certain health services (general
practitioners, specialists, etc.). We estimated concentra-
tion and horizontal inequity indices for the use of each
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following Zhong [6]. With the available data it cannot be
argued that observed changes are entirely due to the im-
pact of the AUGE reform and not to other concomitant
factors. However, the article provides an exercise of com-
parative statics that can be seen as a first approach to the
evaluation of the reform (if such evaluation is possible).
The article presents three contributions. First, the
levels of inequality in terms of the use of health services
were estimated for a set of variables pre-and post-
reform. This makes the changes in relation to the use of
such services for different socioeconomic groups evi-
dent. Second, the indices of inequality and horizontal in-
equity were estimated for an important range of
variables of use, which have not been considered in pre-
vious studies in Chile. The fact that these variables were
compared after a comprehensive reform of the health
system adds a policy evaluation dimension that is new to
Chile. Third, the indices of inequality and inequity were
analytically broken down in order to identify the pure
distributional impact of the observed changes. To the
best of our knowledge none of these three issues have
been previously addressed in the literature. The follow-
ing section briefly describes the AUGE reform as well as
evidence about its impact, in terms of use of medical
care, improved chances of survival for different groups,
etc. Section 3 presents the data sources as well as theFigure 2 Chile: Evolution of beneficiaries by insurance provider (1990methodology used in the analysis. Section 4 shows the
results obtained followed by a discussion about their
interpretations in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents
the conclusions.
The health system in Chile
The Chilean health system is characterized by a dual sys-
tem of insurance and healthcare benefits. The public in-
surance system, conducted by the National Health Fund
(FONASA) is the most important in terms of beneficiar-
ies. According to Figure 2, 74% of the population was
insured by FONASA in 2010 after a strong increment
starting in 1997. FONASA is financed by payroll contribu-
tions (7% of gross wages with a cap) and receives, in
addition, a contribution from the Central Government
(from general taxes) aimed to cover the insurance of people
without payment capacity and the cost of having the fund
to provide healthcare services. Within FONASA there are
four types of insurances: the first two (Funds A and B)
cover indigent and low income individuals (for these, pub-
lic subsidies are complete or very high), while the
remaining two (Funds C and D) are comprised of members
who contribute (and for them the public subsidy is lower).
Private insurance is structured primarily around
Provisional Health Institutions (ISAPRES) that in 2010
concentrated just under 17% of the population. As in the
case of public insurance, ISAPRES receive 7% of the–2010) [7].
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such insurance and are accepted by these institutions.
Affiliates of ISAPRES are free to contribute more than
7% of their gross wages if they choose to do so. In the
case of ISAPRES, there is no public subsidy for
those who wish to be a part of these institutions but
do not have sufficient resources to afford the respective
premiums.
An important part of the duality in the Chilean health
system arises from the difference in the way both sub-
systems function and the fact that there is no integration
between them. Public insurance works as universal in-
surance would but without the “universality” simply be-
cause some people choose not to take part in it;
however, it does have basic pillars of “universality” in
terms of risk and income solidarity and the inability to
deny insurance. The public subsidy also adds a moder-
ately progressive redistributive element within it. On the
other hand, private insurance runs on strict market
logic: make sure the people that are insured can afford
the premium and have a relatively low expected risk.
The regulation of ISAPRES has been relatively lax, which
has led to common practices of ex-ante (i.e. cream-skim-
ming) and ex-post (e.g. risk adjustment for sex, age or
health conditions) risk selection.Table 1 Population distribution by type of insurance, income
Household per capita income
Year 2000 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quin
FONASA 86.8 78.6 65.8 52.5 2
ISAPRE 3.7 8.9 18.4 30.7 5
Others/don’t know 9.5 12.4 15.8 16.8 1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10
Year 2003
FONASA 90.9 85.2 75.9 60.0 3
ISAPRE 1.6 5.7 11.5 24.4 5
Others/don’t know 7.5 9.1 12.6 15.6 1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10
Year 2006
FONASA 92.3 88.8 81.6 69.1 4
ISAPRE 2.2 4.0 8.0 17.0 4
Others/don’t know 5.4 7.2 10.4 14.0 1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10
Year 2009
FONASA 93.2 90.3 85.1 72.3 4
ISAPRE 1.5 3.5 6.7 16.6 4
Others/don’t know 5.3 6.2 8.2 11.1 1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10
Source: Own calculation based on CASEN surveys.This coexistence of public and private insurance is
found in many health systems, such as the UK, The
Netherlands, etc. The difference between these and Chile
is that in these countries there is no choice of leaving
the universal insurance (usually public), which carries
full risk solidarity. In these, private insurance is optional
and complementary. In Chile, by contrast, private insur-
ance is an alternative to the public one. This has at least
two immediate effects; the first is that through the selec-
tion of risks ISAPRES have managed to keep an
expected risk (cost) portfolio below the system average.
Table 1 shows the population distribution among insur-
ance systems according to autonomous income quintiles
of the household, sex and age of its members.
From this table it is clear that between 2000 and 2009
ISAPRES concentrated individuals from the top two
quintiles of income (because they can afford the pre-
miums offered by ISAPRES), a proportion of men above
the population average (due to lower relative risk of
young men versus women of reproductive age) and
youth (under 45 years, mainly). While 79% of the popu-
lation was in FONASA (CASEN 2009) 87.5% of the
population over 65 years belonged to the public insur-
ance (only 5.6% were in ISAPRES). During the same
year, while ISAPRES had 13% of the total portfolio,quintile, gender and age groups
Gender Age
tile 5 Male Female 0-17 18-44 45-64 65 and more Total
8.3 62.7 68.1 68.0 59.9 66.0 81.9 65.5
5.8 21.5 20.1 21.8 23.4 19.2 6.5 20.8
5.9 15.8 11.7 10.2 16.7 14.8 11.6 13.7
0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3.2 69.2 74.0 74.9 66.8 71.4 83.5 71.7
1.2 17.3 16.1 16.7 18.9 16.1 6.2 16.7
5.6 13.5 9.9 8.3 14.3 12.4 10.3 11.7
0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3.0 74.3 79.2 79.7 72.4 75.8 88.3 76.9
4.1 14.3 12.7 13.4 15.8 13.2 4.3 13.5
2.8 11.3 8.1 6.9 11.8 10.9 7.4 9.7
0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
4.6 76.6 80.8 81.5 75.0 77.3 87.5 78.8
4.3 13.9 12.3 12.2 15.2 14.2 5.6 13.1
1.0 9.5 6.9 6.3 9.8 8.5 6.9 8.2
0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Therefore, FONASA has concentrated those members
who have higher relative risk/cost and lower incomes.
The second effect is that the expenditure in health
provisions per beneficiary (excluding out-of-pocket ex-
penditure) is inferior for FONASA than for ISAPRES.
The reason is simple: ISAPRES affiliates have greater
relative ability to buy health insurance and have a lower
risk/cost. Figure 3 shows the evolution of expenditure
per beneficiary of FONASA as a proportion of expend-
iture per beneficiary of ISAPRES, which went from
about 35% in 2001 to just over 60% by 2009. Despite
the sharp increase in public spending in healthcare
over the last decade, there is still a significant gap in
the amount received by beneficiaries of both insurance
systems.a
Finally, the provision of healthcare services also
reflects a dual public and private partnership. The pub-
lic system is structured under the National Health Ser-
vice (SNSS), which besides the Ministry of Health
includes 29 healthcare providers through a network of
public hospitals and others by formal agreement. Pri-
mary healthcare is largely decentralized in the munici-
palities. Individuals without insurance can access the
public healthcare network so, in practice, FONASA acts
as a “last resort” insurer.
Furthermore, there is a network of for-profit private
providers (independent professionals, clinics, hospitals,
etc.). Most users of the private healthcare system areFigure 3 Expenditure per beneficiary of FONASA (as a percentage ofISAPRES beneficiaries, beneficiaries of FONASA groups
C or D, or individuals on waiting lists of guaranteed
healthcare services.
Duality in insurance and provision did not impede the
improvement of the population’s health indicators (thanks
to good epidemiologic control), but it did generate great
inequalities in the distribution of these health gains. Vega
shows that towards 1998 when health indicators had
already improved considerably, the infant mortality for
children who had mothers with no formal education was
almost 6 times greater than the mortality for those who
had mothers with formal education [8]. The causes of
death for the population generally associated with neo-
plasms or cardiac diseases showed an inverse correlation
with the level of education. The National Health Survey in
2003 also revealed variations in the prevalence of certain
risk factors depending on socioeconomic level. Hyperten-
sion, for example, was 70% more likely in lower socioeco-
nomic groups; obesity was 60% more prevalent in such
groups; and finally, diabetes was 200% more likely [9]. In
part these differences can be explained by structural social
determinants, but also because of differentiated access to
the health system.
The AUGE health reform
The gradual implementation of a health reform in Chile,
known as AUGE, began in 2005. The aims of this reform
were manifold: to reduce the accessibility gaps identified
between different socioeconomic groups; to give greaterexpenditure per beneficiary of ISAPREs) [7].
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ing health prevention; to guarantee access to quality and
timely care at a non-catastrophic cost for high-impact
health problems [4]. The proposed reform sought to
achieve these objectives without changing the funda-
mental organization of the health sector. There was a
failed attempt to change the logic of this dual function-
ing insurance market (through the implementation of a
Risk Compensation Fund between FONASA and
ISAPRES that would have allowed the free movement of
members between the different insurance companies),
yet this initiative was politically boycotted [10].
The core of the AUGE reform consisted in defining a
list of health conditions for which universal access (inde-
pendent of insurance choice) and timely care was guar-
anteed, with a guaranteed quality (from the protocols
defined for each condition) and with a guarantee of fi-
nancial protection if the cost of the treatment exceeded
a specified amount. The initial list included 25 condi-
tions and the guarantee started in mid-2005. Fifteen
more conditions were added in 2006, 15 more were
added in mid-2007 and finally 10 more by mid-2010.
Currently there are 66 guaranteed health conditions,
with plans to expand the list to 80.
Guaranteed conditions were chosen on a multi-
criterion basis, in which epidemiological criteria (those
for which the years of potential life lost were greater),
cost-effectiveness (diseases for which existing treatments
were cost-effective), and sufficient coverage (possibility
of covering potential demand at national level) were
considered. Some diseases (like HIV/AIDS, for instance)
were included not because they met the above criteria,
but because of the social impact they have (social prefer-
ence criterion). However, not all criteria were given the
same weight. Vargas and Poblete show that among the
first 56 conditions guaranteed almost 90% of them satis-
fied the epidemiological criteria and the socialTable 2 Reasons for not using AUGE healthcare guarantees
FONASA A + B F
Preferred another practitioner/clinic 13.7 2
Chose not to wait 8.7 1
Thought AUGE would be of inferior quality 2.2 6
Previous insurance coverage 2.2 1
Paperwork to access to long 5.2 5
Not included in AUGE guarantees 3.2 3
Did not know about AUGE guarantees 37.8 1
Another age Group 2.6 3
Medical doctor did not recommended AUGE 3.7 1
Another reason 20.6 1
Total 100.0 1
Source: Own calculation based on CASEN 2009.preference criterion with other criteria being far less im-
portant than these [11]. The prioritization meant that
the first 56 conditions guaranteed represented 73% of
the burden of disease, 51% of hospital discharges in the
public system in 1996 and 60% of deaths in 1999 [5].
Since its implementation the guarantee system has
served just over 11.8 million cases (until March 2011) of
which almost 95% are FONASA beneficiaries; 81% of the
cases treated were outpatients, 11% were hospitalizations
and the rest are mixed cases. Five diseases account for
62% of total cases: hypertension (17%), acute respiratory
infection (16%), outpatient dental emergency (16%), de-
pression in people over 15 years old (7%) and diabetes
mellitus type II (6%).b Within these conditions the per-
centage of ISAPRES beneficiaries who took the guaran-
tees varies considerably. Acute respiratory infection
(ARI), for example, reaches only 3% of the total cases
(both ISAPRES and FONASA beneficiaries) and 6% for
hypertension and depression at age 15 and over
accounts for only 14% of the total cases [12]. This sug-
gests that ISAPRES users would have used guarantees
(which means receiving attention in clinics or hospitals
which were pre-established by insurers and providers ra-
ther than by beneficiary election) mainly as a comple-
ment to their individual insurance plans. In cases where
individual insurance coverage is not important, as in the
case of psychiatric care, users would have chosen AUGE
coverage. For cases were private coverage was important,
such as ARI, individuals chose to use private insurance
instead of the AUGE modality (freely choosing their
healthcare provider). Table 2, based on CASEN 2009,
shows that for ISAPRES beneficiaries the main reason
they have not taken part in AUGE is because they would
rather personally select their specialist or facility (35%).
The existence of prior coverage explained 8% of cases
and has the highest percentage among ISAPRES affili-
ates. By contrast, among members of FONASA A and BONASA C + D ISAPRE None Another/Don’t know
3.9 34.7 17.0 26.2
6.4 6.7 5.0 4.6
.1 6.0 9.0 0.9
.8 7.9 2.2 7.9
.0 3.5 6.1 1.4
.2 4.1 5.3 1.5
9.4 16.8 17.8 15.6
.3 1.0 0.8 2.2
.3 0.9 0.0 1.7
9.5 18.4 36.9 38.1
00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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ing the guarantees and what they included. Urrutia et al.
studied this problem for the use of Pap tests, finding
similar reasons for non-use of guarantees as those
described in Table 2 [13]. Missoni and Solimano pointed
out that in several cases medical practitioners discour-
aged AUGE use, which is also shown in Table 2 [14].
Table 3 shows how the number of consultations has
evolved between 2006 and 2010 for the initial diseases
and treatments included in AUGE. Acute Myocardial In-
farction for example, has had an explosive increase (over
100% average annual growth in FONASA). Also, acute
respiratory infections had an average annual growth of
28% in FONASA and 33% in ISAPRES. This does not
imply an increase in the prevalence of these conditions
at a general level and not necessarily an increase in the









Health condition FONASA ISAPRE FONASA ISAPRE FONA
Terminal Chronic renal
Insufficiency
2,026 151 2,832 305 3,21
Congenital Cardiopathies 3,077 182 5,917 338 6,89
Cervical Uterine Cancer 8,737 569 14,122 938 15,03
Palliative care for terminal
cancer patients
5,787 177 11,874 475 13,22
Acute myocardial infarction 10,286 421 43,218 736 74,12
Diabetes Mellytus type 1 717 467 701 491 775
Diabetes Mellytus type 2 85,022 7,634 91,496 9,900 80,15
Breast cancer 4,366 911 8,327 2,093 9,35
Spinal Dysraphism 214 8 458 27 531
Scoliosis, Surgery in patients
younger than 25
150 73 400 131 449
Cataracts 16,353 712 36,358 1,521 55,14
Severe Hip Arthritis
requiring replacement
708 74 1,233 128 1,72
Cleft lip and palate 177 20 298 34 339
Children cancers 542 57 947 118 914
Schizophrenia 992 75 2,115 211 2,52
Testicular cancer 792 135 1,631 230 1,68
Lymphomas in adults 599 109 1,215 228 1,41
Acute respiratory infections
in children




10,487 39 25,522 100 19,76
Arterial Hypertension 262,695 14,667 246,300 22,170 216,3
Nonrefractory Epilepsy 769 103 1,006 213 779
Source: Own calculation based on FONASA statistics.previously attended in both the public and private sys-
tem. What it probably does imply is that there is a re-
allocation of resources within both the public and
private system as to attend to them within the guaran-
teed timeframe. In other cases, such as schizophrenia or
cataracts, coverage levels particularly in the private sys-
tem were relatively low and the introduction of AUGE
led to an increase in accessibility for these conditions.
In terms of costs, it is estimated that by 2010 eight dis-
eases concentrated half of the expenses for the entire
system (public and private) [5].c A significant proportion
of these diseases are preventable, which means that by
taking widespread measures, such as educational policies
and prevention programs, these costs could be greatly
reduced.
Once this reform was implemented significant waiting













SA ISAPRE FONASA ISAPRE FONASA ISAPRE FONASA ISAPRE
0 184 3,400 394 3,276 285 17.4 23.6
4 233 10,558 438 7,287 348 33.3 24.1
9 1,088 14,460 1,540 15,429 1,441 20.9 36.3
7 532 14,116 981 14,290 869 35.2 70.0
9 509 82,039 1,279 84,664 957 101.9 31.5
787 788 766 810 521 4.1 3.7
6 7,416 72,601 9,113 70,357 7,280 −6.1 −1.6
7 2,110 11,647 2,641 9886 2,234 31.3 34.9
40 1,128 49 1,059 30 70.4 55.4
62 1,261 248 563 157 55.4 29.1
5 1,724 86,929 2,338 51,294 2,069 46.4 42.7
7 99 4,018 178 2,024 139 41.9 23.4
19 498 59 301 44 19.4 30.1
67 1,551 155 1,089 125 26.2 29.9
0 240 4,420 291 2,705 262 39.7 51.7
1 200 2,632 290 1,490 287 23.4 28.6
8 207 2,094 316 1,662 297 40.5 39.7
54 7,038 333,748 12,452 306,583 10,697 28.2 33.8
8 60 22,609 105 20,721 55 25.5 12.1
76 15,249 185,628 24,621 169,272 17,246 −13.6 5.5
267 723 150 676 177 −4.2 19.8
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patients (about 1.75% of the consultations for the guar-
anteed conditions) in the public sector. This situation
was generated because of the inadequacy of resources
available for public care and resulted in the creation of
the “AUGE Voucher” in early 2011, by which those
insured by FONASA could also be seen by private provi-
ders should the time limit guarantee not be respected.
This has permitted healthcare centers to decongest, bal-
ance weight within the system (not just the public sec-
tor) and also, rapidly reduce waiting lists. In September
2011 this had helped reduce the number of cases to just
over 16,000. This “AUGE Voucher” is one of the first
formal steps taken by the public sector to try to integrate
the public and private providers, meaning that the public
subsidy given to FONASA beneficiaries could be used in
the private sector.
Far less clear is the effect that the reform has had on
medical attention of diseases not included in AUGE.
However, the existence of waiting lists for AUGE treat-
ments and strong political pressure on health service
managers to reduce these was a strong indicator that in
practice, AUGE had shifted resources and attention from
other diseases. The existing information on non-AUGE
waiting lists is practically non-existent. According to a
private study done on a small set of non-AUGE diseases
in October 2007, the number of cases of these patholo-
gies on waiting lists was twice that corresponding to
AUGE diseases. Additionally, 83% of the non-AUGE
waiting lists were for as long as two months or more
[15]. A similar result was found by Gonzalez, which was
based on the study of an AUGE disease (Chronic Renal
Insufficiency) during the testing phase of the reform
[16]. Recently, it was informed that there are non-vital
interventions (like tonsil operations, hernias, and hip
surgeries) that have an average wait of 3.5 years. On a
national level, there are more than 69 thousand surgeries
on hold [17]. By 2011, according to FONASA there are
more than 89 thousand cases on the waiting list [18].
Waiting lists in both AUGE and non-AUGE conditions
are indicative of the reform being implemented with
capacity constraints in both medical infrastructure and
human resources. For instance, the density of physicians
in Chile is 10.9 per 10000 population, whereas in com-
parable Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay such figure is
31.6, 17.2 and 37.4, respectively. The density of nurses
and midwives in Chile is 6.3 per 10000 inhabitants, while
it is 4.8, 65 and 55.5 in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay,
respectively. The number of hospital beds per 10000
inhabitants in Chile is 21, while it is 41 in Argentina, 24
in Brazil and 29 in Uruguay [19].
There are no impact assessments on the AUGE re-
form, although some studies have reported partial indi-
cators of some of its effects. Infante and Parajeidentified, for example, the groups that have contributed
to financing the reform (basically made from public
funds and from an increase in the VAT tax rate) [4]. It
has been argued that even though the taxes used to fi-
nance the reform are regressive, it is the low-income
group that receives a higher net subsidy for health bene-
fits linked to AUGE. Additionally, there has been a
strong increase of medical tests performed in the public
health system, resulting from the investment in diagnos-
tic equipment (like scanners, for example). Bitrán et al.
showed that six chronic conditions included in AUGE
(arterial hypertension, diabetes mellitus type I and II, de-
pression, childhood epilepsy and HIV/AIDS) have had
significant changes in health outcomes [5]. The propor-
tion of cases that receive treatment (calculated over a
potential demand) has increased noticeably and the mor-
tality rates of these conditions have declined (in some
cases like depression or childhood epilepsy have had a
99% decline). Hospitalization rates have decreased for
some conditions (hypertension, diabetes mellitus type I
and HIV/AIDS), as a consequence of improved out-
patient treatments, while others have increased (Type II
diabetes mellitus, childhood epilepsy, depression) as a
consequence of greater coverage.
Nazzal et al. found that hospital mortality for acute
myocardial infarction declined significantly after the im-
plementation of AUGE and attributes this to the adop-
tion of treatments based on medical evidence (from the
definition of treatment protocols) [20]. Concha et al.
found significant differences pre- and post-AUGE in the
prenatal detection of congenital heart disease (possibly
due to the inclusion of prenatal tests in the AUGE) [21].
Both studies are based on observations in a group of
hospitals (the former ten hospitals, the latter two).
Infante and Paraje showed that the financial protection
given by AUGE to the families of the lower decile (at
least in its first stage of implementation) is moderate for
two reasons [4]. First, because AUGE did not represent
anything new in this area for families belonging to
FONASA groups A and B (with free care in the public
system before the implementation of AUGE); and sec-
ondly, because the main health expense for these fam-
ilies was the purchase of medicine; this item was not
only not diminished with the AUGE reform but has
increased.
The evaluation of AUGE by users and the general
population has been diverse over time. From its imple-
mentation until 2010, the positive considerations to-
wards the benefits granted by AUGE increased for
FONASA and ISAPRES beneficiaries alike [22]. Table 4
is based on data from CASEN 2009, and it shows that
the level of user satisfaction in terms of time and health-
care quality compliance is similar among beneficiaries of
both types of insurers. The greatest satisfaction is
Table 4 Perceived time and quality compliance in AUGE healthcare conditions
Perceived time compliance
FONASA A + B FONASA C + D ISAPRE None Another/Don’t know Total
Very good 20.8 20.8 29.9 18.1 19.3 21.1
Good 50.7 48.7 50.5 41.3 51.2 50.4
Fair 18.0 17.5 13.9 22.7 19.2 17.9
Bad 6.1 7.9 2.3 8.4 5.4 6.2
Very bad 2.7 3.2 1.0 2.5 2.3 2.7
Don’t know 1.6 1.9 2.4 6.9 2.5 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Perceived quality compliance
FONASA A + B FONASA C + D ISAPRE None Another/Don’t know Total
Very good 21.3 22.4 28.3 17.2 18.6 21.6
Good 52.1 49.1 53.8 39.7 51.3 51.6
Fair 16.9 16.2 11.4 24.6 21.7 16.9
Bad 5.3 6.7 3.1 8.7 3.7 5.4
Very bad 2.7 3.2 0.8 1.2 1.9 2.6
Don’t know 1.7 2.4 2.5 8.6 2.8 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculation based on CASEN 2009.
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system.
Since 2010, these positive evaluations have diminished,
but are still higher than the negative ones. The main
issues that influenced the negative evaluations are
related to existing waiting lists, inability to choose provi-
ders and quality of care received (especially for the bene-
ficiaries of FONASA). Also, since the beginning of the
reform there has been a significant lack of awareness
about how to use the guarantees, which even include
doubts about what AUGE is and what it consists of (al-
though this lack of knowledge has tended to decline over
time). It is expected that the reduction in waiting lists
will improve the opinion of AUGE. The evolution of
user perception of the health system (not just respecting
AUGE) in general is less clear, and has been adversely
affected by waiting times (also in non-AUGE diseases)
and the general quality of care received.Methodology and data source
Concentration index (CI) and horizontal inequity index (HI)
In order to analyze the effect on inequality and horizontal
inequity in the use of medical services pre and post-AUGE
reform, we used a decomposition of concentration and
horizontal inequity indices, proposed by Zhong [6]. This
decomposition allowed us to consider whether changes
in these indices (pre and post-reform) were produced by
an increase in the widespread use of medical services
(“mean effect”) or if they were the result of a change inthe socioeconomic distribution in the utilization of these
services (“distribution effect”).
The concentration index has been widely used in lit-
erature on health inequalities because of its easy calcula-
tion and interpretation (analogous to the well-known
Gini coefficient). Basically, the index ranks individuals or
households according to some socioeconomic stratifica-
tion variable (income, expenditure, assets, education,
etc.) and compares such a ranking with the distribution
of a health outcome or healthcare use variable [23]. The
mathematical expression that defines the concentration
index is:
C ¼ 2cov y;Rð Þ
μ
where cov (y,R) is the covariance between the health
outcome (with a population mean equal to μ) and the
relative rank of individuals in terms of a socioeconomic
variable (income, for example). In the event that the
socioeconomic distribution of the health variable is
“pro-rich” (i.e. it is relatively concentrated among indivi-
duals of higher socioeconomic status) the concentration
index is positive and is negative otherwise. The closer it
is to 1 (in absolute value), the higher the socioeconomic
concentration of the health variable.
On the other hand, horizontal inequity in healthcare
use measures how differently health services are used
among individuals with equal needs, according to their
socioeconomic level. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer
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attention (from the definition of variables measuring
these needs, such as sex, age, etc.), by excluding factors
not associated with them, like socioeconomic variables,
for example [24]. Thus, for each individual the “needed”
use of medical consultations is estimated, using informa-
tion about their particular variables of need and the
sample mean of variables unrelated to need. The esti-
mate for each individual can be interpreted as the num-
ber of medical consultations that they would receive,
given their personal characteristics, if treated like the
rest who have the same characteristics. So if the health
outcome (number of medical consultations, for example)








where hi is the health outcome/use for individual i, xji is
a vector of “need” variables (i.e. variables proxying for
medical needs such as age, sex, disability, etc.), zki is a
set of “non-need” variables (income, education, occupa-
tion, etc.), α, βj and γk are parameters to be estimated.
These parameters are used along with the mean of the
“non-need” or socioeconomic variables to estimate the
expected value of the health variable (or “necessary” use
of services, in this case):







The estimation of use of medical attention by (indirect)
standardization is equal to [25]:
hISi ¼ hi  hþi þ hμ
where hμ corresponds to the sample mean of the respect-
ive health variable. From this, it is possible to calculate the
horizontal inequity index (HI) as the concentration index
of the variable hIS. A positive (negative) value of the HI
indicates pro-rich (poor) inequity.
Assuming that hmax denotes the health variable of
interest for the year that has the highest mean value and
hmin the same variable for the year in which the mean is
the lowest, thus, for each individual i it is possible to de-
compose the variable
hmaxi ¼ hmini þ di
If the concentration index of hmax is C and for hmin is
C*, it can be shown that [16]:
C ¼ 1 dð ÞC þ dCDwhere d is the ratio between the mean of di and hi
max;
and CD is the concentration index of di. In this case:
ΔC ¼ C  C ¼ d CD  C 
The parameter d can be interpreted as the rate of
change in the health variable’s average and as such,
shows a “mean effect”. The rest of the equation mea-
sures the “distribution effect” of change in the concen-
tration indices. If the distribution of di is more pro-rich
than hmin (CD > C*), the change in inequality is positive
(the distribution of the health variable becomes more
pro-rich). Otherwise, it becomes more pro-poor. In the
case of CD = C*, there are no changes in inequality over
time even if there is an increase (decrease) in the use of
health services. Finally, if there is an equal increase in
the use of these services for all individuals (CD =0), the
change in inequality is equal to –dC*.d
From the horizontal inequity index it is also possible
to determine what portion of change from one period to
another is due to changes in the average use of medical
care (hμ) and how much is due to changes in the socioe-
conomic pattern of deviations between what is used and
what is considered necessary (hi - hi
+). Zhong showed
that [6]:
ΔHI ¼ HI  HI
¼ 1






The first term in parentheses measures the change in
horizontal inequity keeping the average use constant
(“distribution effect”), while the second term in paren-
theses reflects what happens to horizontal inequity when
only the average use of health services changes (“mean
effect”).
Econometric models
Following Grossman, it is assumed that health is
produced within each household and that the use of
healthcare can be explained by individual-level and
household-level variables that determine such use [26].
A reduced-form relationship is thus estimated. This rela-
tionship does not intend to explain potential demand
(there is no information on prices, for example) nor ac-
cess (no information on supply factors), but healthcare
utilization.
Considering the fact that healthcare use is a discrete
variable the most appropriate model to estimate the
equation is a count data model. There is a wide range of
count models; some of them consider the possibility of a
high concentration of non-users, that is individuals who
have not sought any medical care in the period preced-
ing the survey. For instance, the Zero-Inflated Poisson
(ZIP) or Generalized Negative Binomial (GNB) provide a
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count variable (visits or use of medical care) is zero
[27,28]. Using any of them involves considering the use
of healthcare services as a two-decision process. The
first decision models participation, like the decision of
whether or not to use the healthcare service (a binary
decision); while the second decision considers the inten-
sity of this use (given the positive response to the first
decision, the second is a count variable). Models like the
GNB or ZIP integrate both decisions into the same esti-
mation (contrary to, for instance, “hurdle” models that
separate them).
We estimated several econometric models for the dif-
ferent utilization variables used to estimate HI, including
linear models (OLS), Poisson, negative binomial, Zero-
inflated Poisson (ZIP), IP, Zero-inflated negative bino-
mial (ZINB), Generalized Negative Binomial (GNB) and
standard “hurdle” models. The OLS model was dis-
carded for theoretical reasons: it is continuous and
allows negative predictions [27]; from the other models
only one was selected: the one which presented the best
values of the Akaike Information Criterion and the
Bayesian Information Criterion (as used in [29,30]). Fol-
lowing both criteria, the best model was the generalized
negative binomial (GNB), whose results are reported
here (in the Additional file 1: Appendix Table A.1 and
Additional file 2: Appendix Table A.2). The gnbreg com-
mand in STATA 12 was used to estimate the model. Es-
timation was done considering the sampling strategy of
the surveys (through the svy set of commands).
Data
The data comes from the Socioeconomic Character-
ization surveys (CASEN) collected by the Ministry of
Planning. These surveys are representative at the na-
tional, regional and community levels and cover both
urban and rural areas. They possess information on in-
come and socioeconomic characteristics of households
and their members, as well as information about the use
and usage intensity of medical services. Specifically,
there are questions about the number of individuals’ vis-
its to general practitioners, specialists and emergency
rooms in the three months preceding the survey. There
is also information on the number of laboratory tests, x-
rays and ultrasounds performed in the same period and
number of hospitalization days in the year preceding
the survey. In this paper we used the CASEN 2003 (pre-
reform) and CASEN 2009 (post-reform). The former has
257,077 observations and the latter 246,925.
However, the information contained in both surveys
on medical care is not fully comparable. For specialist
care, CASEN 2009 separates the mental healthcare from
the rest of the specialties. These were combined to en-
sure comparability with 2003. Thus, the dependentvariables in the estimated models are the number of vis-
its to general practitioners; specialists; emergency room
visits; the number of laboratory tests; X-rays and ultra-
sounds; and hospitalization days.
Gender and age were considered within the individual
explanatory variables. For women, the age groups de-
fined were 0–4 years, 5–14 years, 15–34, 35–44, 45–59
and 60 and over. For men, the segments were 0–4 years,
5–14 years, 15–44, 45–64 and 65 and older. In both
cases, biological factors were taken into account (begin-
ning childbearing age, menopause, retirement, etc.)
for the definition of these segments. Additionally, we
considered the existence of a physical disability of some
kind and if the person belonged to an aboriginal ethnic
group.
Regarding the educational level of individuals, three
categories were used: low education (completed basic
education or less), middle education (completed second-
ary education) and higher education (tertiary or univer-
sity studies, complete or incomplete). If the individual
was below 21 years old and attending school or univer-
sity, her value for this variable was her mother’s or the
household head’s education (in that order). If the indi-
vidual was older than 21, or younger but not attending
school, her schooling level according to the aforemen-
tioned categorization gave her value for this variable.
This criterion was chosen to be able to include indivi-
duals younger than 15 (usually not considered in this
type of analysis). For these cases, the mother’s education
is considered following evidence on its effect on child
health status [31,32].
Working status was considered as an individual-level
variable (with two categories: employed and unemployed
or inactive) unless the person was younger than 15 years.
In this case, the head of the household determined the
value for this variable. Marital status was considered in
two possible categories: married or live-in partner and
others. In the case of children under 18 years old the
value of this variable was determined by the mother or
by the head of household (in that order), unless the
minor was already married or cohabiting.
Finally, household-level variables taken into account
were: area, political region, income per equivalent adult,
and type of health insurance. For the latter, three cat-
egories were considered: FONASA (any of the four
funds), ISAPRES (which includes the beneficiaries of the
armed forces and other private insurance) and no insur-
ance at all. The area was a dichotomous variable (urban/
rural) and the political region was one of the 13 regions
that existed in 2003 or one of the 15 regions in 2009.
Both surveys contained information on cash income
for each household member from labor and capital
sources, as well as monetary subsidies granted by the
State. They also contained information on non-cash
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ship. However, only cash income was considered here to
determine total income per equivalent adult, which is
total household income divided by the number of
“equivalent” members and adjusted by a household
economy-of-scale parameter [33]:
No Equivalent Adults ¼ No 14 older
þ 0:75∗No less 140:75
where No_14_older is the number of individuals 14 and
older 14 in the household, No_less_14 is the number of
children younger than 14. The power parameter is the
household economy-of-scale, measuring the existence of
“intra-household public goods”. Total individual income
per equivalent adult (IEA) is, thus:
IEA ¼ Total Household Income
No Equivalent Adults
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of total house-
hold income per equivalent adult and the use of health-
care interventions by geographic area for CASEN 2003
and 2009.Table 5 Descriptive statistics of medical care use
2003
Number of visits Urban Rural Total Urban
General practitioner 1,940,990 283,960 2,224,950 3,822,90
Emergency room visits 1,294,417 144,879 1,439,295 1,512,46
Specialist Doctors 2,929,237 240,908 3,170,145 3,427,42
Laboratory Exams 1,876,600 182,586 2,059,186 3,739,19
X-ray and ultrasound 853,060 59,911 912,971 1,300,73
Hospitalization days 6,910,579 1,058,445 7,969,024 6,526,84
Mean
Income 218,693 110,721 204,560 322,07
General practitioner 0.1443 0.1402 0.1437 0.2648
Emergency room visits 0.0962 0.0715 0.0930 0.1046
Specialist Doctors 0.2177 0.1189 0.2048 0.2374
Laboratory Exams 0.1395 0.0901 0.1330 0.2594
X-ray and ultrasound 0.0634 0.0296 0.0590 0.0903
Hospitalization days 0.5137 0.5224 0.5148 0.4496
Standard Deviation
Income 121.6 177.7 108.6 136.7
General practitioner 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003
Emergency room visits 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002
Specialist Doctors 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003
Laboratory Exams 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003
X-ray and ultrasound 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
Hospitalization days 0.0012 0.0031 0.0001 0.0011
Chile 2003 and 2009.
Source: Own calculation based on CASEN.Table 5 shows that the average total individual income
per equivalent adult in the urban sector has been con-
sistently higher than rural and that such income at
current prices increased almost 50% between 2003 and
2009. Regarding healthcare use, mean visits to general
practitioners rose sharply (79% at the national level) as
did laboratory tests (89% across the board). In addition,
the mean of emergency room visits grew (10%), as did
consultations with specialists (8%) and X-rays and ultra-
sounds (47%). On the other hand, the length of hospital
stays decreased (10%).
While the increase in use of healthcare services may
not be directly associated to the reform (from the point
of view of the data emerging from the CASEN there is
no visible difference between AUGE and non-AUGE
consultations) there is no doubt that the reform has
increased the overall use of health services (based on
data emerging from other sources such as FONASA or
the Superintendence of Health). Therefore, whether the
increased medical attention was AUGE-related or not, it
is legitimate to analyze this change (and its socioeco-
nomic pattern) as a result of the reform. This does not
imply that all change in the use of healthcare services2009 Percentage change 2003-2009
Rural Total Urban Rural Total
6 443,012 4,265,918 97.0 56.0 91.7
4 175,868 1,688,332 16.8 21.4 17.3
1 225,962 3,653,383 17.0 −6.2 15.2
2 412,163 4,151,355 99.3 125.7 101.6
3 129,433 1,430,166 52.5 116.0 56.6
8 1,192,165 7,719,013 −5.6 12.6 −3.1
9 190,821 305,300 47.3 72.3 49.2
0.2100 0.2578 83.5 49.9 79.4
0.0833 0.1019 8.7 16.5 9.6
0.1071 0.2207 9.0 −9.9 7.8
0.1957 0.2513 86.0 117.2 88.9
0.0613 0.0866 42.4 107.4 46.8
0.5634 0.4642 −12.5 7.8 −9.8
198.2 122.4 - - -
0.0005 0.0002 - - -
0.0003 0.0001 - - -
0.0005 0.0003 - - -
0.0006 0.0003 - - -
0.0003 0.0001 - - -
0.0034 0.0010 - - -
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in other relevant variables (such as family income, rela-
tive prices, preferences for health care, etc.). In the ab-
sence of information on these variables, this paper
assumes that these variables (or at least their distribu-
tion) remain unchanged between 2003 and 2009.
Results
The concentration indices for general practitioners care,
specialists, emergency room, laboratory tests, X-rays and
ultrasounds and hospital days were estimated from
CASEN 2003 and 2009 data. Additionally, we estimated
the Gini coefficient of total individual income per
equivalent adult. These data are shown in Table 6.
The income concentration index (Gini coefficient)
shows a slight decline between 2003 and 2009. However,
it remains at a high level showing a highly concentrated
distribution of income (Chile has one of the world's
highest Gini). The specialized care, lab tests and X-rays
and ultrasounds had strong pro-rich distributions. How-
ever, in all cases this decreased between 2003 and 2009.
Visits to general practitioners went from a moderately
pro-poor CI to moderately pro-rich. By contrast, emer-
gency care and inpatient days have concentration indices
showing a pro-poor distribution, which is relatively
stable over time. This inequality pattern (pro-poor for
general practitioners and pro-rich for specialists) has
been frequently observed in literature from both devel-
oped and developing countries [6,34,35].
Table 7 shows the decomposition of the concentration
index for medical care, while Table 8 displays the de-
composition of horizontal inequity indices for different
types of medical attention. Both tables show mean
utilization of medical care services, concentration indi-
ces (both for 2003 and 2009) and changes in those vari-
ables. In addition, they show the estimates of the mean
and distribution effects for those changes and, in the last
column, which of them prevails (if any).
Discussion
The fact that some of these healthcare services have a
pro-poor distribution (as shown in Table 6) does notTable 6 Concentration indices (CI)
Concentration Index 2003 2009
Income 0.5446 0.5157
General practitioner −0.0265 0.0275
Emergency room visits −0.1034 −0.0978
Specialist Doctors 0.1835 0.1583
Laboratory Exams 0.1362 0.1084
X-ray and ultrasound 0.1809 0.1175
Hospitalization days −0.0710 −0.0785
Source: Own calculation based on CASEN.necessarily show a desirable situation. The greater rela-
tive use of emergency care and hospitalization by the
poor may come from the fact that when they do access
the system it is in more critical situations than average.
There is no information that directly corroborates this
hypothesis, but indirect evidence is given from the type
of payment made in each intervention. During 2003, for
example, of those who attended a general practitioner,
58% had free medical care (outside the ISAPRES). In the
case of specialists that percentage was 37% and in the
case of emergency treatment was 64%. In 2009 the per-
centage of individuals who received free care from gen-
eral practitioners and specialists was 60% and 42%
respectively. In the case of emergency treatment, the
percentage was 70%. This would imply that for both
years (pre and post-AUGE) a significantly higher per-
centage of those who used emergency room visits did
not pay for their visits, as compared to other medical
visits. This could indicate that in the case of general or
specialized care, relatively poor individuals choose to
postpone or avoid a visit since in a high percentage of
cases they have associated costs. In the case of emer-
gency care there is a lower possibility of doing the latter.
In terms of changes of inequality (Table 7), with the
exception of specialists’ care and hospitalization days,
what has dominated the change in the concentration
index pre and post-reform is the mean effect. In the case
of general practitioners, average use increased strongly
between 2003 and 2009 and, in turn, the rate went from
slightly pro-poor to slightly pro-rich. This implies that
the “extra care” that occurred in this period was carried
out on individuals with a relatively high socioeconomic
ranking. The opposite happened with specialized care,
the average use of specialized doctors rose moderately in
this period, but their distribution became more pro-poor
(or rather, less pro-rich since it was still mostly concen-
trated on individuals of higher socioeconomic status). In
fact, if we estimate the concentration index of the great-
est number of healthcare consultations between 2003
and 2009, it has a value of −0.15, which is strongly pro-
poor. While it is not possible to link these results dir-
ectly to the reform (because they do not control other
variables such as price changes, income, new services,
etc.) there is a striking contrast between these two types
of medical services. If it is believed that conditions
included in the AUGE reform are intensive in specialized
care (beyond the first stage of diagnosis), it is a legitim-
ate hypothesis that the distribution effect observed in
specialists is a consequence of the reform.
In the case of laboratory tests, X-rays and ultrasound
scans, the mean effect prevailed but there were differ-
ences between them. For laboratory tests, the increase in
average use had a distribution reflecting a pro-rich
socioeconomic pattern (although less than the original),
Table 7 Decomposition of concentration indices
Mean Concentration index Change Decomposition
2003 2009 2003 2009 CI Mean effect Distribution effect Result
General practitioner 0.1437 0.2589 −0.0265 (*) 0.0275 0.0540 0.4450 0.1214 Mean effect
Emergency room visits 0.0929 0.1025 −0.1034 −0.0978 0.0056 0.0933 0.0600 Mean effect
Specialist Doctors 0.2048 0.2217 0.1835 0.1583 −0.0253 0.0764 −0.3307 Distribution effect
Laboratory Exams 0.1330 0.2520 0.1362 0.1084 −0.0278 0.4722 −0.0589 Mean effect
X-ray and ultrasound 0.0589 0.0868 0.1809 0.1175 −0.0635 0.3214 −0.1974 Mean effect
Hospitalization days 0.5148 0.4685 −0.0710 −0.0785 0.0075 0.0899 0.0834 Non-defined
All Cis are statistically significant at 99%, except (*) that is significant at 95%.
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rays and ultrasound. Again, there is no direct evidence
that this has been linked to AUGE, although the increase
in imaging equipment investments (in scanners, for ex-
ample) suggests indirect evidence that the mean effect
found in this area is a result of the reform.
Finally, in the case of hospitalization days, the effect is
undefined because the mean effect has practically the
same magnitude as the distribution effect. In this case,
the average fell between 2003 and 2009, but the concen-
tration index remained the same. The reduction of in-
patient days followed a pro-poor pattern, which means
that the poor reduced their hospitalization days more
than the rich. This could be in line with better health-
care in stages before hospitalization (making it unneces-
sary to reach hospitalization) or more advanced surgical
techniques (and previously unavailable) requiring shorter
hospital stays.
When horizontal inequity is taken into consideration
(Table 8) the panorama changes significantly. First, it
should be mentioned that during 2009 all HI, with the
exception of X-rays and ultrasounds became more pro-
rich or less pro-poor, compared to 2003. The use of gen-
eral practitioners moved from a pro-poor HI to a slightly
pro-rich one, which indicates that once needs are con-
sidered, relatively rich people increased their use of this
service between 2003 and 2009 beyond their (expected)
needs. In fact, this is what was observed by decompos-
ing. The distribution effect was higher than the mean ef-
fect, which implies that the near doubling of visits toTable 8 Decomposition of Horizontal inequity (HI) Indices
Mean Horizontal inequity index
2003 2009 2003 2009
General practitioner 0.1437 0.2589 −0.0273 (*) 0.0465
Emergency room visits 0.0929 0.1025 −0.0968 −0.0737
Specialist Doctors 0.2048 0.2217 0.1784 0.1824
Laboratory Exams 0.1330 0.2520 0.1128 0.1170
X-ray and ultrasound 0.0589 0.0868 0.1703 0.1317
Hospitalization days 0.5148 0.4685 −0.0789 −0.0564
All Cis are statistically significant at 99%, except (*) that is significant at 95%.general practitioners was mainly explained by variables
unrelated to need and related to socioeconomic factors.
The emergency procedures showed similar results. In
both 2003 and 2009 the HI was pro-poor which shows us
that after considering needs, it was the relatively poor
people that made more use of this service. The average
use of the same service rose slightly in 2009 over 2003,
but became less pro-poor. In this case, however, and
given that the average use increased slightly, the distribu-
tion effect is only marginally higher than the mean effect.
In the case of medical specialists, in both 2003 and
2009 the HI was strongly pro-rich, a signal that after
considering needs it was high-income people that made
more use of this service. Between these years the average
use increased moderately (which would decrease the HI)
but the HI became more pro-rich. Both tended to be op-
posite effects, without one dominating over the other.
The same is true for laboratory tests, which rose
sharply between 2003 and 2009, whereas HI remained
constant. This would indicate that the sharp increase in
the use of this service was primarily intended to cover
the common needs for all socioeconomic groups. In the
case of X-rays and ultrasound scans, the sharp increase
in the use of these implies a decrease in HI between
2003 and 2009 (the extra benefits were concentrated
among lower socioeconomic groups). In this case, the
mean effect prevailed over the distribution effect.
Finally, in the case of hospitalization days the average
usage decreased and the HI became less pro-poor. The
distribution effect prevailed slightly over the mean effect,Change Decomposition
HI Mean effect Distribution effect Result
0.0738 0.0372 0.1110 Distribution effect
0.0231 −0.0076 0.0155 Distribution effect
0.0041 0.0151 0.0191 Non-defined
0.0042 0.1047 0.1089 Non-defined
−0.0386 0.0624 0.0238 Mean effect
−0.0225 −0.0078 −0.0303 Distribution effect
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affected by the decrease in the use of this service after
considering their specific needs.
Conclusions
The results of the previous section, although preliminary
in the absence of systematic data on the impact of the
AUGE reform on equity and being only a comparative
statics exercise, show some clear conclusions. The first
is that between 2003 and 2009, the average use of med-
ical care increased, and in some cases quite significantly.
The increase in the average number of visits to general
practitioners, laboratory tests, X-rays and ultrasounds
showed a very significant mobilization of resources for
medical care. This is consistent with the increase in
spending per beneficiary of public health insurance and
the large equipment purchase in the public healthcare
system. Many of the conditions covered in AUGE re-
quire research and analysis for detection and monitor-
ing, which was the main reason why this investment in
equipment was made.
The second conclusion is that in terms of inequity the
increase in average use has not always led to an im-
provement in its socioeconomic distribution. In fact, the
horizontal inequity index (HI) increased in many cases.
Although this increase was modest for medical specia-
lists and laboratory tests, it was important for other ser-
vices such as general practitioners and emergency care.
Both types of healthcare services, whose use is more
prevalent among lower income groups, decreased their
pro-poor profile in this period. This result is curious in a
period where a reform that held equity improvement as
one of its main pillars was implemented. According to
estimates provided herein, equity in the use of the ma-
jority of healthcare services decreased. The exceptions
are the use of x-rays and ultrasounds and hospitalization
days.
The fact that there was an increase in horizontal in-
equity during this period does not invalidate the reform
but casts doubt on whether it has been the best strategy
to achieve the equity goal. The reform sought to im-
prove equity by increasing access to certain treatments
for socioeconomic groups that were relatively neglected
before the reform. However, the reform has provided
universal access to these treatments. There has been no
specific strategy for focusing such increased access and,
as such, it has benefited individuals across the socioeco-
nomic gradient. This may be linked to the concept of re-
form itself: the AUGE reform sought to reach the
poorest individuals through universal benefits. This
strategy, associated with the rights-based approach in
health and the necessity for political approval of the re-
form, would result in a dissipation of the benefits from
this reform mainly among higher socioeconomic groups.In addition, there is evidence that the implementation
of the reform occurred under capacity constraints.
Human resources in health (and also infrastructure)
were already relatively small before the reform.
Increased access to guaranteed conditions seems to have
aggravated this constraint to the point of generating
waiting lists in both AUGE and non-AUGE conditions.
Evidently, waiting lists are severely biased towards low
socioeconomic patients. Increasing the number of condi-
tions guaranteed by AUGE (inclusion that not always
followed equity criteria) may have aggravated this
problem.
A natural question that arises from these results is
whether a reform like AUGE was needed to increase the
use of healthcare services. In recent years, even before
the reform, the amount of resources destined to
FONASA was significant, resulting in partial closure in
the health expenditure gap with ISAPRES. The conse-
quences of the reform, in terms of healthcare use, aimed
to strengthen the previous trend and channel it towards
a certain group of conditions resulting in a reallocation
of resources within the public sector. Results show that
prioritization has occurred, instead of an across-
conditions increase. This has not yet happened among
ISAPRES beneficiaries, which may explain why, after the
reform, equity in healthcare use has not increased.
Endnotes
aThe contribution by the Central Government to
FONASA as a proportion of FONASA’s total expendi-
tures went from 45% in 2002 to 60% in 2010. This rela-
tive increase occurred during a persistent period of
growth due to increased membership and benefits
received by FONASA beneficiaries.
bType II diabetes mellitus, hypertension and acute re-
spiratory infection were guaranteed from the beginning
of AUGE, while depression and ambulatory dental emer-
gencies were added later (the first in 2006 and the sec-
ond in July, 2007).
cThese are: terminal chronic renal insufficiency, dia-
betes mellitus type II, arterial hypertension, depression
in people 15 years or older, dental emergencies, HIV/
AIDS, preventive medical exam, and breast cancer in
women 15 years or older.
dThis result is consistent with what happens in the
Gini Index: if income increases by the same amount
across individuals, the index decreases.
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